Emory Corporate Governance and Accountability
Review
Volume 4
Issue 1 The Effectiveness of Corporate Compliance Programs: Questions Posed to Two Top
Litigators
2016

Corporate Compliance Programs: Pretext or Panacea?
Justin S. Brooks

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ecgar

Recommended Citation
Justin S. Brooks, Corporate Compliance Programs: Pretext or Panacea?, 4 Emory Corp. Governance &
Accountability Rev. 1 (2016).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ecgar/vol4/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory Corporate Governance and Accountability Review by an authorized editor of
Emory Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

BROOKS GALLEYSPROOFS

12/16/2016 2:56 PM

CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS: PRETEXT OR
PANACEA?
Justin S. Brooks ∗
Proponents of corporate compliance programs loudly sing their praises
while detractors point to ceaseless prosecutions and a parade of civil suits—
often resulting in multi-billion dollar verdicts or settlements—as evidence that
they are ineffective. So, are corporate compliance programs a panacea or a
pretext? The truth lies somewhere in between.
As a threshold issue, corporations are for-profit institutions. Indeed, most
corporations have a mandate to maximize profit for shareholders. This can
encourage senior management to operate in grey areas, and regulators may
later deem their actions (and board oversight of such actions) to violate a wide
array of laws. Second, formalistic compliance programs are not enough to
ensure internal reporting of potential fraud and are not enough to inspire
companies to take appropriate corrective actions. Instead, as set forth below,
companies must take steps to ensure effective implementation of compliance
programs and foster a culture of corporate compliance.
The countervailing factors that motivate officers and directors to engage in
or acquiesce to fraudulent conduct or, alternatively, devise and implement an
effective compliance program warrant in-depth treatment in a standalone piece.
Here, I turn to answering the specific questions posed with these general
principles in mind.
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Question 1: Do corporate compliance programs actually suppress
information from regulatory oversight?
Response: Yes, often appropriately. But meritorious—and sometimes nonmeritorious—allegations of misconduct tend to get reported externally where
internal responses are inadequate or the company has not created a culture
of compliance and reporting.
Recent reports, compiled through surveys of hundreds of senior executives
from a broad range of industries, indicate that roughly two-thirds of United
States companies are affected by fraud. 1 Costs to companies, including
reputational damage, can be substantial as can costs associated with
remediation and investigation of fraudulent practices.
Internal reporting programs such as corporate compliance hotlines
represent a company’s first line of defense against corporate fraud. Internal
whistleblower hotlines are a key component of a company’s anti-fraud
program: where such hotlines are implemented, tips are typically the most
common method of detecting fraud. 2 Moreover, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(“SOX”), international guidelines from the European Union, and the U.S.
Federal Sentencing Guidelines have deemed hotline reporting programs a good
and necessary business practice. At the same time, internal compliance hotlines
serve to screen out frivolous and baseless claims.
In my experience counseling and defending large corporations on
employment matters and corporate compliance, reports to company
ombudsman, managers, or human resources and compliance personnel often
lack merit or do not implicate fraud. Employees often file malicious or
fictitious complaints against fellow employees or the organization to ward off
pending termination or to seek revenge for perceived slights. But treating
employees with respect, even in these situations, can dissuade employees from
unwarranted external reports.
Unfortunately, despite strong incentives to self-report credible evidence of
wrongdoing, companies may conceal such evidence. Like companies,
whistleblowers have incentives under various statutory regimes to report
1 KROLL, 2013/2014 GLOBAL FRAUD REPORT, WHO’S GOT SOMETHING TO HIDE? 12 (2013),
http://www.kroll.com/en-us/global-fraud-report.
2 See, e.g., ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD
AND ABUSE, 2014 GLOBAL FRAUD STUDY 19 (2014), https://www.acfe.com/rttn/docs/2014-report-tonations.pdf.
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internally. For example, under the SEC whistleblower program established by
the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“DoddFrank”) in 2010, a whistleblower’s participation in internal compliance
systems will generally increase an award and interference with or bypass of
those systems can decrease an award. 3 A whistleblower who reports conduct to
the SEC within 120 days of reporting internally will also receive credit for any
information the company later self-reports to the SEC. 4
In our experience, external reporting typically follows internal reporting
when an employee felt the company response was not adequate. As of 2014,
80% of company insiders who reported potential misconduct to the SEC first
raised their concerns internally to compliance personnel or their supervisors. 5
Likewise, Guttman, Buschner & Brooks attorneys have represented countless
whistleblowers bringing cases under the False Claims Act and have helped
recover billions of dollars on behalf of federal and state governments. In our
experience, these whistleblowers typically reported internally first and only
sought representation after the company responded inadequately or dismissed
concerns as “this is the way we do business.” Thus, while corporate
compliance hotlines and related reporting mechanisms serve as the first line of
defense against fraud, the False Claims Act, Dodd-Frank and other
whistleblower protection statutes effectively incentive employees to report
fraud externally when a company’s response has been ineffective or where a
company has not created a culture where employees feel comfortable reporting
misconduct internally.
Companies are most likely to dissuade external reporting by creating and
implementing effective compliance programs as well as self-reporting credible
allegations of misconduct. Such self-reporting may also result in cooperation
credit. Indeed, on September 9, 2015, Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates
issued a memo instructing the DOJ to seek individual accountability from
individuals perpetrating wrongdoing in the course of fighting corporate fraud
and misconduct. 6The memo was sent to every United States Attorney, the

3

17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(4); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(b)(3).
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(7).
5 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 16 (2014), http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annual-report-2014.pdf.
6 See Memorandum from the Office of the Deputy Attorney Gen. to the Assistant Attorney Gen.,
Antitrust Div., the Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Div., the Assistant Attorney Gen., Criminal Div., the
Assistant Attorney Gen., Envtl. and Nat. Res. Div., the Assistant Attorney Gen., Nat’l Sec. Div., the Assistant
4
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Assistant Attorney General heading up each DOJ division, the Director of the
Executive Office for United States Trustees, and the Director of the FBI.
Consistent with the Yates directives, we have seen renewed focus on
individual accountability in the False Claims Act cases we have litigated
alongside the government over the past year. This has manifested in the
government’s decision to name individual executives as defendants in
complaints in intervention, the structure of settlements, and a myriad of other
ways.
In keeping with its renewed focus on individual liability, the Yates memo
articulated several changes to DOJ policy regarding the definition of
“cooperation credit” for corporations. These changes are applicable to criminal
as well as civil enforcement matters. Corporations historically have received
and continue to receive more favorable settlement terms when the government
concludes they provided material cooperation with respect to a government
investigation. But companies have struggled to understand what it means to
“cooperate” in a post-Yates world.
In a September 27, 2016 speech, Principal Deputy Associate Attorney
General Bill Baer provided some insight as to what such cooperation now
entails, highlighting the importance of prompt and material assistance. 7 Merely
responding to a subpoena or civil investigative demand (“CID”) will not
qualify as cooperation. Rather, a company hoping to obtain cooperation credit
is expected to provide specific information about any and all employees
involved in wrongdoing that is unknown to DOJ and that materially assists in
its investigations. Thus, while meritless claims not implicating fraud are
properly vetted and disposed of through company screening without ever
coming to the attention of government regulators and investigators, an
effective compliance program will also develop mechanisms to affirmatively
identify and provide material information to regulatory agencies investigating
the company.

Attorney Gen., Tax Div., the Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, the Dir., Exec. Office for U.S. Trs., & all U.S.
Attorneys (Sept. 9, 2015) https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download.
7 See Bill Baer, Principal Deputy Assoc. Attorney Gen., Remarks at Society of Corporate Compliance
and Ethics Conference (Sept. 27, 2016) https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/principal-deputy-associateattorney-general-bill-baer-delivers-remarks-society-corporate.
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Question 2: Do corporate compliance programs create an environment
where employees are led to believe that wrongdoing in the corporate
environment is implausible because a compliance program exists?
Response: No. But implicit or explicit directives from management can lead
to false beliefs that particular actions comport with the law.
A corporate compliance program should and generally does sensitize
employees to the fact that wrongdoing is plausible. A strong compliance
program often identifies the relevant laws applicable to an employees’ day-today activities and may include fact patterns the company has identified as
violative of relevant laws. For example, compliance training for
pharmaceutical sales representatives is likely to and should inform employees
that promoting off-label uses of company drugs can be deemed to be a
violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and likewise expose the
company to liability under the False Claims Act. 8
Having said that, we have represented relators in False Claims Act cases in
which company management has been warned by its own third-party
regulatory consultants that certain conduct and types of interactions with
physicians is proscribed. These companies have nonetheless directed such
conduct in business plans, training documents, and other written directives to
sales representatives. Similarly, employee performance reviews may—in
writing—encourage conduct that is deemed by the government to be unlawful.
Managers may also encourage such conduct when accompanying employees
on sales detailing visits.
Thus, the existence of written policies and a compliance program does not
itself create an environment where employees believe wrongdoing is
implausible. But written directives, communications, and training by
management can cause employees to believe that particular conduct is
appropriate and in conformity with stated company policies and cause them to
ignore other signs or evidence that such conduct is—in fact—unlawful.

8 The type of conduct that qualifies as “promotion” and the degree to which certain activity may be
protected by the First Amendment involve a nuanced assessment, is largely unsettled, and varies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this article.
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Question 3: From a practical viewpoint, what kind of corporate compliance
programs work better than others?
Response: Corporate compliance programs that incorporate the principles of
communication, responsiveness, and transparency
Above all, compliance programs should be transparent and comprehensible
to employees (and management), and the goals of enforcement mechanisms
should be clearly communicated. Measures also must be implemented to
ensure prompt and efficient responses to allegations of corporate wrongdoing.
How this manifests will vary from industry to industry and company to
company. It largely depends on the service or product a company offers,
specific rules and regulations that govern the company, the size and geographic
breadth of a company, and a myriad of other factors.
In addition to general principles of communication, responsiveness, and
transparency, certain key factors tend to underlie effective compliance
programs:
1. Guidelines: companies should have explicit guidelines that instruct
employees how to perform their jobs in a legal and ethical manner,
including training programs, codes of conduct, and written
performance standards.
2. Surveillance: companies should have official policies and procedures
that detail the manner in which they will monitor employees and how
(and to whom) employees can report wrongdoing.
3. Sticks and Carrots: companies should identify and implement
sanctions for wrongdoing as well as rewards in the form of promotions
and positive reviews for demonstrated competence and compliance
with company guidelines. A program can be well-drafted on paper but
useless in practice if a company does not punish misconduct or reward
behavior it wishes to incentivize.
4. Leadership: it is not enough to have formal procedures in place to
foster compliance. The “water cooler” conversation and conduct of
top-level management are equally important. The “tone at the top” and
informal communications as set by leadership behavior is critical, but
it is equally critical for top management to monitor and instill the
same behavioral norms in middle management.
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5. Independence of compliance personnel. Local management are rarely
trained as investigators, and may be part of the problem. Likewise,
local human resources personnel may appear to employees to be
aligned with management and unlikely to take employee concerns
seriously, disincentivizing employees from raising concerns about
potential misconduct. Accordingly, effective compliance programs
often provide mechanisms for employees to report concerns to
independent third parties (such as ombudsmen) specifically trained in
addressing employee concerns. Depending on the nature of the
complaint, legal personnel, compliance officers, or human resources
personnel may need to become involved after the initial investigation
has begun.
Corporate compliance programs play an important role in modern corporate
governance. But they are only as good as management’s commitment to
effective resolution of employee concerns and implementation of corrective
action when credible misconduct has been identified. Companies have strong
incentives to get it right.

